[ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
One of the most difficult tasks will be rebuilding the US relationship with
France, which was severely damaged by the Iraq debate. Not only did relations at
the top levels of government suffer, but public opinion in the two countries moved
decisively against the other. Both governments began moving toward reconciliation
early in 2004,22 but it has been a slow and difficult process.
The US French relationship has never been and may never be the most
comfortable that either country has in its ties with other nations. However, the
fact is that US and French interests in the world overlap more than they conflict.
As Guillaume Parmentier and Michael Brenner have observed, France and the
United States have been a quarrelsome pair, yet their mutual interests force them
to work out the terms of a revived and thriving alliance. 23 Moreover, the United
States knows that France not only can make serious trouble for its foreign and
defense policy goals from its position on the UN Security Council and as a leading
member of the European Union, but also can be a very helpful partner in dealing
with future security challenges. For its part, France knows it cannot achieve its
foreign and defense policy goals in permanent opposition to the United States, and
that its interests are best served when the two countries cooperate. Both countries
therefore have a strong mutual interest in moving beyond the Iraq crisis.
Build a new Euro-Atlantic front on Iraq, Iran and Middle East peace
One of the ways the allies can move beyond the divisive debate over Iraq is
to establish new foundations of cooperation on issues of direct and immediate
86 S.R. Sloan
concern to their interests. Fighting terrorism has already been recognized as one
of these areas. Even at the height of differences over Iraq, the United States and its
European allies cooperated closely at many formal and informal levels to disrupt
and destroy Al Qaeda cells, communication networks and financial connections.
There is no doubt that such cooperation will continue, even if the United States
calls it a war and the Europeans view it as a struggle.
However, the fight against terrorism cannot succeed unless the allies also deal
effectively with the stabilization in Iraq, containment of Iran s nuclear weapons
capabilities, and, perhaps most importantly, resolution of the Israeli Palestinian
dispute. The chances for effective collaboration appear to have been enhanced by
a number of factors.
The European countries that opposed the war in Iraq know that a destabilized
Iraq, which serves as a refuge and breeding ground for international terrorism, is
contrary to their interests. The United States seems to have recognized that it will
need help from the other major international players and from the United Nations
to shepherd the process of Iraqi stabilization.
In Iran, European diplomatic efforts, backed up by the implicit threat that the
United States and/or Israel could use force to try to prevent Iran from going nuclear,
appeared to have made some progress in convincing Iran s leadership to reconsider
the costs and benefits of becoming a nuclear power. However, all bets came off in
October 2005 when Iran s president called for wiping Israel off the map, forcing
the United States and the European powers to rethink the strategy in which the
Europeans played the good cop while the United States stayed in the background
holding the bad cop threat of military options. The Bush administration clearly
believes Iran has decided to become a nuclear weapons state. Whether or not that
conclusion is shared by the European countries, Russia and China will largely
determine whether the international community will take effective, unified action
against Teheran. As long as there are questions about this issue, it will be difficult to
keep the UN Security Council together. Deciding how to respond to Iran s defiant
attitude will undoubtedly create tensions between the United States, which is
determined to impose consequences on Iran for the decision, the Europeans, who
undoubtedly will be less enthusiastic than the United States about sanctions against
Iran, and Russia, which may well oppose any serious sanctions altogether.
With regard to the Israeli Palestinian conflict, Yasir Arafat s passing created a
possible opening for a political settlement. Even though the success or failure of
peace efforts will rest primarily on the shoulders of the new Palestinian leaders and
the Israeli government, the United States, Europe and Russia, working together,
could help facilitate the process.
Continue to manage the transitions in Europe
At a time when most of the threats to allied security emanate well beyond Europe,
the United States and the European allies should not lose track of important proc-
esses of transition still underway in Europe that could affect their future security.
First and foremost, the NATO countries need to manage their relationship with
NATO beyond Russia 87
Russia in ways that encourage the development of a democratic country that one
day could be considered for NATO membership. There is much work left to be
done, and undoubtedly many bumps in the road. In the meantime, the cooperation
NATO has developed with Russia should be expanded in every way consistent
with NATO s value base and current missions.
As Dmitri Trenin has suggested, the West will have to count on economic
forces rather than lectures about democracy to bend Russia back in more positive
directions. Trenin advises caution and patience: Today s Russia may not be pro-
Western, but neither is it anti-Western & the West needs to calm down and take
Russia for what it is: a major outside player that is neither an eternal foe nor an
automatic friend. 24
An associated challenge is facilitating Ukraine s progression from a former
Soviet republic to a position inside Europe s institutions, including NATO. The
allies also will have continuing responsibilities in the Balkans, ensuring some
peaceful, stable framework for its future and membership in European institutions
for former Yugoslav republics who seek them.
Looking ahead
It is impossible to predict confidently which path the Alliance will follow in the
years ahead. History suggests that the Alliance has incredible staying power. It
has survived crises over the development of Soviet strategic nuclear weapons
(1950s), the advent of détente (1960s), France s departure from the NATO inte-
grated military command (1967), the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1979), the
deployment of intermediate range nuclear missiles in Europe (1980s), the end of
the Cold War, the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union (1989 91), and the recent
differences over Iraq. Against this backdrop, it seems safe to suggest that the
Alliance will survive its recent crisis and persist as a viable organization for the
foreseeable future.
However, each crisis has left the Alliance somewhat different than it was before.
Today, the skeptics say the end of the Cold War removed the glue that had held the
Alliance together, and that the Iraq dispute is the most recent case in point. If the
Alliance continues, they argue, it will be an empty shell. More optimistic observers
note that while European and American member governments were fighting over
what to do about Iraq, they were agreeing to dramatic changes in NATO s missions
and capabilities, perhaps giving the Alliance key roles in the global struggle against
terrorism, conflict and instability.
The most important characteristic of the new international system remains the
emergence of the United States as the only true global power not omnipotent,
[ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]