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first by what was done through the Slavophile movement in the nineteenth century and later
by the Communists, who did not act on any Christian basis, but because they also thought
they could save the deteriorated Western world.
I can also give some counterexamples, namely Italy and Germany in the late nineteenth
centuries, who were motivated more by power than vocation. Germany especially felt no true
vocational consciousness under Hitler; she was conscious only of power. Germany was
destined for catastrophe, because the lack of a history, a culture, the absence of a founded
vocational consciousness, left an empty space. And then Hitler could impose on her the
fantastic idea of blood and soil, and of Nordic race, and other nonsense which of course was
ridiculed by the best German minds, although they failed to understand that it was not only
ridiculous but also revealed the outlook of a disintegrating lower-middle class, capable then of
producing Nazism. So vocation is a very important concept. In my acceptance speech, when I
received the Peace Prize in Germany, I discussed it very seriously. And the Germans, to my
great astonishment, accepted it. A vocational consciousness, however, was certainly lacking
in the Bismarckian and Hitler eras.
Student: To continue our analysis, then, you have from the two elements of power and
vocation the greatest danger and the basic problem of nationalism. The factor out of which the
quasi-religious element of nationalism arises is the tension between these power and
vocational aspects of national life. Dr. Tillich states that a union of these two elements makes
the quasi-religious nature of nationalism possible. Fascism, probably the most extreme
example of nationalism in the world, involves, like any other extreme nationalism, a denial of
the finitude of the nation and likewise of the ambiguities, distortions, and evils of the system.
This denial of the finitude of the nation gives rise to severe suppression of criticism and
deviating opinions, and consequently to wholesale murder.
With respect to the nature of the encounter of the religious proper with nationalism, a
narrowing takes place in the religion proper as it tries to defend itself against the invading
ideology. The degree of susceptibility of any true religion is a function of what Dr. Tillich
refers to as the fragility of that religion. Spiritual Protestantism and liberal humanism he
characterizes as fragile forms of religion, because of the "dialectical" nature of their contact
with such ideologies as nationalism. This makes them more fragile, and consequently more
subject to invasion by foreign forces, than the more dogmatic religions such as Catholicism.
Do you agree with this summary, Dr. Tillich?
Dr. Tillich: I agree. It is a bit sketchy, but it is absolutely correct.
Student: Well, then we can continue with the questions that occurred to us as we worked on
this problem of nationalism. We came up with four important questions. The first of these is
as follows: According to Dr. Tillich (and I quote), "If the national consciousness is humanized
and becomes aware both of its own finite validity and the infinite significance of what it
represents, even though ambiguously, a nation can become a representative of the
supranational unity of mankind, which is in religious language the Kingdom of God."1 Now
our question is: Has there ever been, or could there ever be, a case where these ideal
conditions exist in history? In other words, is this more than just a theoretical consideration?
Dr. Tillich: I agree with you that it s an essentialist consideration. I mean, this is in the
structure of essential truth or the essential structure of things as they are created, and
theoretically should therefore be a right description. In actual existence the nation, along with
every existing thing, is distorted. And if you ask me to give an example of ideal conditions, I
would have to confess that a fully adequate example cannot be cited. Of course not. But
approximations can be found. I would say, so far as I see, that the United States now
approaches the ideal. And I speak as one who has come from outside, and is therefore
probably not very susceptible to an inborn nationalism. I would say the United States has
achieved this sense of the unity of mankind to a greater extent than many other nations.
I would add, at the same time, that pre-Bismarckian Germany showed some traits of this. It
was continually attacked, but it counterattacked very little. This of course led to a lack of
centralized power, and the emperor remained only a figurehead for a long time.
I would also praise England for the way in which, in the nineteenth century, she mediated
among divisive forces in the world, although always in self-interest. This we should not
forget. It is the power interest, and we should not call it necessarily bad, since otherwise a
nation is open, like Germany before the Bismarck era, to attacks from all sides and to
disintegration from within. That has been the fate of Germany ever since the Thirty Years
War, and probably even earlier.
These are examples to instruct us in the idea of approximation. This idea is necessary as a
criterion by which to judge existing conditions. If you accuse me of idealism I would answer
that, if idealism concerns itself with finding the essential structure of reality, then I am an
idealist; and probably you also, if you attempt to form judgments at all. Otherwise, we must
call ourselves positivists. But the very moment in which we make a judgment about anything
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